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In the opening paragraph of its recently filed appeal of O’Bannon v. NCAA (August 
8, 2014), the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) clearly positions 
college sport as inextricably tied to higher education:
College sports have a long and cherished history. They contribute to the overall 
college experience; they play a lasting role for alumni; they attract millions 
of fans and, at times, large television audiences; and, most significantly, each 
year they help thousands of people pursue a college education (O’Bannon v. 
NCAA, November 14, 2014, p. 2).
Asserting “[t]he goal of the NCAA is to integrate athletics with academics” 
(O’Bannon v. NCAA, November 14, 2014, p. 26), NCAA chief legal officer Donald 
Remy cautioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to not allow “the 
plaintiffs and the district court to untether college athletics from the academic 
experience” (Solomon, 2014, para. 19)
In their brief, the NCAA claimed college athletes are just like any other col-
lege students, fully integrated into the academic community and enjoying greater 
academic success than regular students:
Integrating student-athletes into the academic community improves their 
educational experience. Full participation in that experience—not just meeting 
academic requirements, but also studying, interacting with faculty and diverse 
classmates, and receiving academic support such as tutoring and mentor-
ing—generally leads student-athletes, especially those from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, to reap more from their education, including enjoying higher 
graduation rates and better job prospects (O’Bannon v. NCAA, November 14, 
2014, p. 11).
In support of this claim, the NCAA has characterized college athletes’ aca-
demic success as “nothing short of remarkable…with a record percentage of 
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student-athletes achiev[ing] graduation, the ultimate goal of entering college” 
(Hosick, 2014, para. 3).
The NCAA Brand
In addition to being an institution comprised of the association (e.g., member 
institutions, conferences, governance structure and affiliated entities), membership 
(e.g., colleges and universities), and the national office (National Collegiate Athletic 
Association [NCAA], 2004, p. 2), the NCAA is also a brand. One of the NCAA’s 
brand attributes is “Student-athlete success on the field, in the classroom and in 
life” (see ncaa.org public homepage). Athletes’ academic success is specifically 
highlighted, not only on the public homepage, but also throughout the website. 
Under the pull-down menu heading “What We Do” the first heading is “academics” 
and “academic success” is prominently highlighted on subsequent links.
From its inception the NCAA brand—like any institutional brand—has faced 
external threats, such as physical injuries or deaths of athletes, gambling scandals, 
Congressional inquiries, and “…the dreaded notion that NCAA athletes could be 
identified as employees by state industrial commissions and the courts” (Byers & 
Hammer, 1995, p. 69). Notably, throughout its history the NCAA has also faced 
a variety of legal challenges (e.g., NCAA v. Board of Regents, 1984; NCAA v. 
Tarkanian, 1988; Law v. NCAA, 1998; Bloom v. NCAA, 2004). Currently, three 
legal actions (O’Bannon v. NCAA, 2009, 2014; Jenkins v. NCAA, 2014; and 
Northwestern and CAPA, 2014), which have been simultaneously praised and 
condemned as signaling, “the end of college sports as we know it!” embody the 
ongoing debate as to whether the NCAA college-sport brand is compatible with 
the stated academic mission of colleges and universities.
What has been lost amid the dissonance of college-sport critics and defenders 
is the NCAA national office’s “focused, centralized leadership” (NCAA, 2010a, 
para. 1) in advancing the NCAA brand. An integral part of this brand advancement 
has been a quarter-century-long strategy of rebranding college athletes’ academic 
success. In response to what Greyser (2009) refers to as a “corporate/organizational 
brand crisis” (p. 590), the NCAA—on an institutional level—has focused on two 
primary branding/rebranding elements: “…(a) a shared understanding of how indi-
vidual initiatives should both reflect and connect to the brand, and (b) the discipline 
to stay on message and on brand” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 1). This academic-success 
rebranding initiative, is consistent with other rebranding campaigns in which the 
NCAA created, disseminated and imbedded rebranded concepts, including: “student-
athlete” and “Collegiate Model of Athletics” (Byers & Hammer, 1995, Sack & Stau-
rowsky, 1998, Southall & Staurowsky, 2013). Rebranding theory provides a context 
from which to view twenty-five years of NCAA management and communication 
decisions in rebranding academic success and yields insight into the association’s 
legal strategies in response to the external threats of O’Bannon, Jenkins and NLRB.
Rebranding Framework
According to the NCAA, its institutional brand1 “…is a collection of the Associa-
tion’s messages, visual presentation, decisions, actions, behaviors, relationships and 
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experiences” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 2). Branding nuances include such concepts as 
“…living the brand, the role of experiences and internal branding” (Merrilees & 
Miller, 2008, p. 537). Corporate, organizational or institutional branding involves 
utilizing traditional marketing communication and planning frameworks to transmit 
a brand to identified publics (Olins, 1978; Gregory, 1991, Dowling, 1994). In the 
process of institutional branding, an institution’s logics (Southall, Nagel, Amis, 
& Southall, 2008) figure strongly and explicitly in the developed brand (Hatch 
& Schultz, 2003). Gapp and Merrilees (2006) note such structures are critical to 
brands, since they are part of each brand’s essence.
Rebranding is distinct from branding, which is the “…initial coherent articula-
tion of the corporate brand and can occur at any time (Merrilees & Miller, 2008, p. 
538). Re-branding is the dislocation and reformulation of a brand, resulting in a new 
brand articulation. A change in the vision associated with a brand often requires 
(or results from) a change in the management process. Just as initial institutional 
branding requires getting individuals and institutional units to adhere to institutional 
logic(s) and ceremonial facades (Southall et al., 2008), re-branding necessitates 
moving the institution from one mindset or logic(s) to another.
Similar to corporate or organizational rebranding, rebranding on an institu-
tional level occurs in response to identified issues, threats or challenges. The first 
steps in the rebranding process are focusing on identifying the extent to which the 
brand needs to be changed, justifying the brand revision to relevant stakeholders, 
recognizing and anticipating potential internal resistance to such change, develop-
ing a well-structured change management program that aligns with an institution’s 
core values and alerting all institutional members to the forthcoming rebranding. In 
addition to satisfying existing stakeholders and publics, any proposed rebranding 
must also meet the needs of new market segments. Utilizing internal and external 
communication platforms, all institutional members must be invested; the rebrand 
must be consistent with institutional logics.
Most often, if the crisis is not severe, institutions seek to implement a rebrand-
ing campaign strategy methodically, integrating rebranding elements through mass 
and nonmass media platforms. In larger organizational or institutional settings, 
a branding and communication group that may include the following staff units 
often coordinates a rebranding process: Brand Strategies and Events (BSE), New 
Media Strategies and Content Development (NMSCD), and Public and Media 
Relations (PMR) (NCAA, 2010b). A BSE unit “…provides full-service integrated 
communications to advance an [institution’s] mission” (NCAA, 2010b, para. 5). 
NMSCD develops an institution’s online strategy. PMR “…implements and man-
ages an issues management communication model” (NCAA, 2010b, para. 7). This 
model includes “…proactive, reactive and crisis-response initiatives and strategies” 
(NCAA, 2010b, para. 7) that are tailored to identified issues.
Utilizing various communication platforms, an institution can strategically 
target audiences or publics and aggressively advocate for its brand (NCAA, 2010b). 
While advertising or public service announcements may be used, effective public 
relations has a comparative advantage in changing attitudes. Social campaigns can 
be coordinated through a branding group, which generates content through which 
the rebrand can be effectively communicated to relevant stakeholders (Southall 
& Staurowsky, 2014). According to Merrilees and Miller (2008), regardless of 
whether the rebranding is minor, intermediate or complete, successful rebranding 
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involves conceptualizing a group of core values, vision, mission, and goals and 
communicating these to relevant publics.
Rebranding may be conceptualized as occurring along a continuum. The level 
of rebranding may be minor, intermediate or complete (Ahonen, 2008; Daly & 
Moloney, 2004). Minor rebranding involves just an aesthetics change, what might 
be considered a minor facelift. Ahonen (2008) describes intermediate rebranding 
as more involved, including elements of “…repositioning, and use of marketing 
tactics, especially communication…techniques to favorably reposition an exist-
ing brand” (p. 32). In this type of rebranding, there is still an association with the 
previous brand. However, in a complete rebrand any ties to the previous brand are 
intentionally discarded and no attempt is made to retain any association with the 
previous brand. Consistent with this framework, Stuart and Muzellec (2004) con-
ceptualized rebranding occurring within a range of evolutionary (e.g., new slogan 
or logo only) to revolutionary change that incorporates elements of name, logo and 
slogan rebranding simultaneously.
Some suggest the rebranding process occurs in identified phases (Ahonen, 
2008; Greyser, 2009). While the phases have been variously titled, most models 
have similar attributes. For our purposes, the following phases will be identified (see 
Figure 1): Phase 1—Triggers and Brand Revision, Phase 2—Rebranding Strategy 
Implementation, and Phase 3—Stakeholder Buy-in and Outcomes.
The first phase: “trigger(s) and re-vision” is when a brand becomes embroiled 
in a reputational crisis (or series of crises), seeks to make sense of the predicament 
in which it finds itself, and determines an appropriate response (Greyser, 2009). The 
trigger(s) may be sudden (e.g., tainted Tylenol capsules) or longitudinal, festering 
over a long period of time (e.g., FIFA World Cup bribery scandal). The crisis may 
result from media attention or advocacy group criticism, governmental scrutiny, 
disaffected consumer/fan complaints, or general public dissatisfaction. In this 
phase, the institution’s immediate response can be either proactive or reactive. The 
reputational crisis may be life-threatening to the institution and its brand when the 
situation affects the essence of the brand (Greyser, 2009; Merrilees & Miller, 2008).
In response to a crisis an institution will likely seek to react as quickly as 
possible, but will simultaneously analyze antecedents or driving forces behind 
the crisis and seek to develop a proactive response (Ahonen, 2008). This initiative 
often involves conducting a situational analysis to identify the brand’s essential 
elements and meaning (e.g., strengths and weaknesses), develop a more complete 
understanding of the crisis situation, and initiate an internal brand revisioning dis-
cussion. Throughout this phase the institution still seeks to maintain continuity with 
past brand meanings. There may be a call to return to the institution’s beloved roots 
(e.g., return to a model of true amateurism, recapture the American auto industry’s 
Figure 1 — Phases of Rebranding.
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glory days). As revisioning proceeds, an institution will make a series of rebrand-
ing decisions, including whether to reposition, rename, restructure, or redesign.
Having decided on a course-of-action, the institution’s leadership will seek to 
implement a chosen strategy or series of strategies. Successful implementation involves 
insuring internal brand understanding and executing selected rebranding activities. 
While these initial steps are being undertaken, an institution may choose to also main-
tain continuity with past brand meanings while simultaneously obtaining stakeholder 
buy-in and methodically implementing rebranding campaign (Ahonen, 2008).
Transitioning to the final phase involves gaining stakeholder buy-in and devel-
oping specific reputational management tactics consistent with reimagined “core” 
values, vision, mission, and goals (NCAA, 2010b; Southall & Staurowsky, 2014). 
Any rebranding plan must insure successful implementation of chosen internal and 
external marketing mixes. Coordination is crucial and is most often the responsibil-
ity of a branding and communication group or functional unit.
Having delineated the rebranding process, the following section summarizes 
a specific historic campaign, in which the NCAA responded to an academic 
reputational crisis by rebranding academic success. Institutional memos, briefing 
documents, research presentations and commissioned reports chronicle how—in 
response to negative publicity about college athletes’ poor academic performance 
(i.e., extremely low graduation rates in NCAA Division-I football and men’s basket-
ball) the NCAA has engaged in a twenty-five year rebranding campaign designed 
to create, disseminate and imbed a new definition of academic success. These data 
support the conclusion that the Academic Progress Program (APP)—specifically the 
Graduation Success Rate (GSR)—has been part of a coordinated rebranding strategy 
designed to protect the collegiate model of athletics by advocating “…for the posi-
tive aspects of intercollegiate athletics as they relate to higher education” (NCAA, 
2010b, para. 1) to several external publics, including Congress, the media, corporate 
partners, college sport fans, recruits and their parents, and the general population.
A Quarter-Century of Rebranding Academic Success
Phase One: Triggers and Brand Revision
While NCAA D-I college football and men’s basketball players have historically 
graduated at significantly lower rates than the general student body (NCAA, 1991), 
it was not until the mid-1980s that this phenomenon among big-time college foot-
ball and men’s basketball players was a well-chronicled issue (Byers & Hammer, 
1995; Hall v. University of Minnesota, 1982; and Ross v Creighton University, 
1992). Strikingly, Nyad (1989) reported 76–92% of professional football and 
men’s basketball players lacked college degrees. In the late 1980s former NCAA 
and Olympic basketball players, believing prospective college athletes and their 
parents had a right to information about their likelihood of graduating, began lobby-
ing members of Congress to force U.S. colleges and universities to publish college 
athletes’ graduation rates (Selingo, 2012). Public scrutiny intensified when several 
high profile athletes, including former Oklahoma State University (OSU) defensive 
end Dexter Manley, revealed before Congress that they were functionally illiterate 
(Jacobson, 1992). Manley testified that despite being enrolled and playing football 
at OSU for four years, he had not learned to read until well after he had left college 
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(Jacobson, 1992). Subsequently, the 1990 Student Right-to-Know and Campus 
Security Act (SRTKA) included a Department of Education (DOE) administered 
program, which required colleges and universities to collect and disseminate student 
graduation rates (i.e., Federal Graduation Rate [FGR]) (See National Center for 
Educational Statistics website: http://nces.ed.gov/collegenavigator/). After initially 
voicing concerns over the federal program, the NCAA acquiesced and agreed to 
make athlete graduation rates public (Selingo, 2012).
In response to the academic crisis, and before the passage of the Student Right-
to-Know Act, the NCAA commissioned a series of research projects to “inform 
our member institutions and others” (NCAA, 1991, p. 1) about college athletes’ 
graduation rates. One project was the NCAA Academic Performance Study (APS), 
which began in 1985 (NCAA, 1994). One of the first reports, published in 1991, 
highlighted the five-year graduation rates of a sample of NCAA athletes (N = 3,288) 
who had enrolled as first time in college students in 1984 or 1985 (NCAA, 1991, p. 
6) The employed methodology was similar to the one eventually used in the six-year 
FGR: “The graduation rates for the following tables were calculated by dividing 
the number of graduates after five years by the number of student-athletes who had 
entered that institution as freshmen in the initial year of the survey” (NCAA, 1991, 
p. 6). However, the study also reported an “adjusted graduation rate…calculated by 
removing all student-athletes who left their institutions in good academic standing 
from the group of initially entered freshmen” (NCAA, 1991, p. 6).
In this initial report, athletes removed from the initial graduation-rate cohort 
were referred to as “eligible dropouts” (NCAA, 1991, p. 10). As can be seen in Table 
1, this adjustment removed approximately 33% of athletes from the sample and 
resulted in an overall adjusted graduation rate of 68.4%—an improvement of 22.7%. 
For male revenue sport athletes, the adjustment, the precursor of the GSR, resulted 
in a 20.4% jump, from 42.1% to 62.5%. In subsequent peer-reviewed articles (i.e., 
McArdle & Hamagami, 1994) as well as NCAA reports (see http://www.ncaa.org/
about/resources/research/academic-initial-eligibility-research), there was no mention 
of eligible dropouts or an adjusted graduation rate. It seemed as if the “eligible drop-
out” effect had been forgotten, just another statistical analysis in yet another report.
Phase Two: Rebranding Strategy Implementation
However, when the NCAA “…launched a major academic reform program in 2003” 
(LaForge & Hodge, 2011, p. 219), the eligible-dropout adjustment reappeared as the 
cornerstone of the Graduation Success Rate. The adjustment was necessitated because, 
“The federally mandated rate is an inaccurate graduation measure” (Brand, 2004, 
para. 53). In virtually every NCAA document, communiqué, or press release since 
2003, the GSR has been identified as an improved and more accurate metric that was 
developed at the request of NCAA members, particularly presidents and chancellors. 
This narrative was initially established in both the 2003 and 2004 NCAA state of 
the association addresses, when NCAA president Myles Brand highlighted the GSR 
as evidence of the newly-instituted reform agenda’s success (Brand, 2003, 2004).
Subsequent to the introduction of the GSR, its positioning as a more accurate 
measure of academic success has become ubiquitous, being imbedded in almost 
every press release and news story on the NCAA.org website, in the mainstream 
media and on university athletic-department websites. In addition, the FGR is 
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consistently described as divorced from reality, understating and/or misstating 
graduation results: “The NCAA also devised a new metric for measuring graduation 
in an effort to amend the shortcomings of the federally mandated methodology” 
(Brown, 2014, para. 11).
With the most recent release of NCAA graduation rates, the degree to which 
the NCAA’s rebranding strategy has been implemented is readily apparent. In the 
following excerpts from press releases posted on an athletic department or confer-
ence websites there is one consistent message: “The GSR is a more accurate and 
better measure that proves athletes are achieving academic success.”
University of South Florida
The NCAA developed the Division I Graduation Success Rate in response 
to college and university presidents who wanted graduation data that more 
accurately reflect the mobility among all college students today.
The GSR is the NCAA’s more inclusive calculation of academic success among 
scholarship student-athletes. The NCAA rate is more accurate than the feder-
ally mandated methodology…
http : / /www.gousfbul l s .com/ViewArt ic le .dbml?DB_OEM_ID= 
7700&ATCLID=209739013
University of Notre Dame
The GSR was created to more accurately reflect actual graduation rates by 
including transfer data in the calculation. College and university presidents asked 
the NCAA to develop a new methodology that takes into account the mobility 
among students in today’s higher education environment. Research indicates that 
approximately 60 percent of all new bachelor’s degree recipients are attending 
more than one undergraduate institution during their collegiate careers.
http://www.und.com/genrel/102914aac.html
University of Oregon
Unlike the federal rate, which tracks only those who enrolled as freshmen and 
counts all students who leave school or transfer to another college against the 
overall rate, regardless of whether or not they graduate from another Univer-
sity, the GSR takes two- and four-year transfer student graduation rates into 
account. Additionally, a student-athlete who leaves an institution in good 
academic standing does not count against a school’s GSR.
h t t p : / / w w w. g o d u c k s . c o m / Vi ew A r t i c l e . d b m l ? D B _ O E M _ I D = 
500&ATCLID=209737235
Atlantic Coast Conference
The Graduation Success Rate was developed by the NCAA as part of its 
academic reform initiative as a better measure of student-athlete academic 
success…
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The federal graduation rate, which is less accurate than GSR because it counts 
transfer students as academic failures, is the only rate that allows comparison 
between the general student body at a school and its student-athletes.
http://www.theacc.com/#!/news-detail/acc-teams-continue-to-set-high-
graduation-success-rate-2014-10-28
Louisiana State University
The NCAA developed the Graduation Success Rate to more accurately assess 
the academic success of student-athletes.
http://www.lsusports.net/ViewArticle.dbml?ATCLID=209746592
University of Alabama—Tuscaloosa
The NCAA GSR and the Academic Success Rate (ASR) were developed in 
response to college and university presidents who wanted graduation data that 
more accurately reflected the mobility among college students today. Both rates 
improve on the federally mandated graduation rate by including students who 
were omitted from the federal calculation.
http://www.rolltide.com/genrel/102814aaa.html
Phase Three: Stakeholder Buy-in and Outcomes
While the NCAA has “…established itself as a strong brand, with its own unique 
attributes” (NCAA, 2010a, para. 4), over the past twenty-five years the NCAA has 
been increasingly challenged to “…provide an alternative to the doggerel of cynics” 
(NCAA, 2010b, para. 4) and protect its brand—the Collegiate Model of Athletics 
in both the court of public opinion and U.S. federal court. The collegiate model is 
“…a term of art… created by Myles Brand [late NCAA president] as a surrogate 
for – but not a replacement for – the concept of amateurism to the degree it was too 
frequently used as a descriptor for intercollegiate athletics” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 1).
The importance the NCAA places on this quarter-century academic success 
rebranding strategy is reflected in its status as the first outcome-oriented goal (i.e., 
“Goals are outcome-oriented statements that represent what will constitute the 
organization’s future successes” [NCAA, 2004, p. 6].) in the NCAA’s 2004 Strategic 
Plan: “Student-athletes will be better educated and prepared for increased life-
long achievement and success” (NCAA, 2004, p. 6). Consistent with fundamental 
strategic-management principles the NCAA strategic plan also outlined several 
objectives, including: “1.2 Increase the number of student-athletes who succeed 
academically” (NCAA, 2004, p. 6).
Not surprisingly, NCAA national office staff members consistently adhere to 
this developed rebranding strategy in communicating with internal stakeholders 
(e.g., university presidents, faculty athletic representatives). In addition, on July 
8, 2014—amid increased Congressional scrutiny and on the heels of a significant 
legal challenge to its collegiate model (i.e., O’Bannon v. NCAA)—NCAA president 
Mark Emmert used this rebranded definition of academic success throughout his 
testimony before the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science & Transporta-
tion. Coming at a time when the NCAA faced “…pressure from multiple fronts to 
reform how athletes are treated and compensated” (The Associated Press, 2014, 
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para. 7), the committee’s goal was to gain a better understanding of “…how the 
NCAA is integrating athletics with academics and to determine if student-athletes 
are being exploited in the process” (McGuire, 2014, para. 1). Leading up to the 
hearing, several committee members had expressed concern about the NCAA’s 
policies, oversight of member institutions, and potential exploitation of athletes.
In this challenging environment (Herndon, 2014) Emmert focused on the 
association’s “…first and foremost [mission]… to promote student-athlete success 
in the classroom” (NCAA, 2014a, para. 2). He also highlighted “a core truth of 
intercollegiate athletics” (NCAA, 2014a, para. 5):
For the vast majority of those who participate in NCAA sports - more than 
460,000 young men and women each year at 1,084 institutions across three 
divisions and in 23 different sports – the experience is exactly what it is 
intended to be: a meaningful extension of the educational process that provides 
the opportunity for students to compete fairly against other students, in an 
educational environment (NCAA, 2014a, para. 5).
Highlighting this success, he noted “…participants in athletics are more likely 
to go to college, to stay and graduate from college, to secure a good job after col-
lege, and earn more money within a few years after college and for a lifetime” 
(NCAA, 2014a, para. 6).
However, while contending most Americans view college sport in a positive 
light, he acknowledged concerns about issues and challenges associated with the 
experiences of NCAA Division-I Football Bowl Subdivision [FBS] football and 
men’s basketball players at 123 well-known institutions in the larger conferences, 
while noting these athletes “…represent only 3.5 percent of all NCAA student-
athletes” (NCAA, 2014a, para. 9). Subsequently, Emmert touched upon a host of 
issues and concerns and mentioned three key points that he felt often go unnoticed 
or unmentioned. Two of the points included: (a) NCAA sports provide access to 
higher education for a significant number of first-generation students, including “…
many whose financial situation would have otherwise prevented them from attend-
ing college” (NCAA, 2014a, para. 13). (b) The NCAA has substantially increased 
support of college athletes’ academic success (NCAA, 2014a).
Contending the NCAA had made tremendous progress in addressing historic 
academic concerns, he offered several success stories, including annual spending 
of $2.1 billion on athletic scholarships, increased initial eligibility requirements, 
mandatory progress toward degree requirements, as well as stringent Academic 
Progress Rates (APRs) and “record” Graduation Success Rates (GSRs). Specifi-
cally, focusing on the most visible sports of FBS football and men’s basketball, 
he referred to NCAA data that shows FBS football players “graduate” at a rate of 
71%, while Division I men’s basketball players are graduating at a rate of 73%—a 
17 percentage-point increase since 1995 (NCAA, 2014a).
Conclusion
Clearly Emmert’s testimony—archived on the NCAA media center under the 
headline: “NCAA president’s testimony on value of college model”—was meant 
to offer evidence the association acts in a manner consistent with its first core 
value “…a belief and commitment to: The collegiate model of athletics in which 
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students participate as an avocation, balancing their academic, social and athletic 
experiences” (NCAA, n.d., emphasis in original).
However, throughout his remarks, which were an extension of the last 25 years 
of NCAA rebranding, Dr. Emmert conveniently failed to mention or address the 
following four points:
 1. Neither the FGR, nor the GSR is perfect or inherently a more accurate metric; 
they use different sampling and statistical analyses to examine different cohorts. 
In short, they are different graduation rates.
 2. The GSR consistently returns a “success” rate 12–25% higher than the FGR. 
As far back as 1989 (NCAA, 1991), the NCAA knew that removing 1/4–1/3 of 
“eligible dropouts” from a “graduation rate” sample would result in a markedly 
higher “success” rate.
 3. A comparison of published FGRs of NCAA athletes and the general student 
population includes a significant number of part-time students at many schools. 
This is problematic because NCAA athletes must be “full-time” students 
making progress toward a degree. Consequently, it makes sense to compare 
full-time college athletes with other full-time students. Without adjusting for the 
possible downward “part-timer bias” in the student-body rate, any comparison 
is likely distorted—or somewhat skewed. Because part-time students take 
longer to graduate, general student-body FGRs may be significantly lower, 
making the relative rate of college athletes at many schools and conferences 
appear more favorable.
 4. Finally, since there is no comparable national-level GSR for the general 
student body, GSR and FGR data should not be reported simultaneously in 
press releases or news accounts. The NCAA’s consistent comingling of FGR-
student and GSR-athlete in press releases or dataset tables invites inappropriate 
comparisons and fosters confusion.
Not surprisingly, given ongoing legal challenges to its collegiate (or “college”) 
model, the NCAA national office has systematically developed and implemented a 
rebranded definition of academic success that seeks to convince a skeptical public 
that “the business of college sports is not a necessary evil, [but] a proper part of 
the overall enterprise” (Brand, 2006, p. 8). As a result creating, refining, imbed-
ding a rebranded definition of academic success, and documenting the associa-
tion’s unprecedented academic success has become a primary focus of the office 
of the NCAA president. This rebranding strategy, consistent with Southall and 
Staurowsky’s (2013) analysis of NCAA institutional propaganda, has sought to 
blunt criticisms of big-time college sport by pointing to record graduation rates as 
evidence college athletes are provided an opportunity for a world-class education. 
While such systematic and sustained rebranding is not inherently unethical, its use 
to silence criticism and obscure critical analysis of the NCAA’s business model is 
problematic, especially in an educational setting.
The NCAA’s rebranding strategy has succeeded in obscuring its institutional 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Southall & Staurowsky, 2013) and allowed it to portray 
itself as nothing more than an educational association. Consistent with Adamson’s 
(1980) analysis, the NCAA has successfully wielded its rebranded “success” rate as a 
linguistic and philosophical “armor of coercion” (Adamson, 1980) to deliberately form, 
control, and alter the attitudes of those within the institutional field of college sport.
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Clearly the NCAA national office has been in the forefront of advancing the 
NCAA brand. Utilizing the APR and GSR as evidence, for the past quarter-century 
the NCAA has shown remarkable discipline in staying on message and on brand in 
successfully rebranding college athletes’ academic success. Following a game plan 
first established in the 1950s, the association seems to be hoping a rebranded definition 
of academic success will offer camouflage for its profit-seeking tendencies. Within 
an institutional field in which a new College Football Playoff is expected to yield a 
$500 million return on two end-of-season semifinal games leading to a “national” 
championship extravaganza (Schroeder, 2012) and the NCAA grosses nearly $800 
million per year as a result of its multibillion dollar March Madness contract (Clarke, 
2013), it is increasingly clear the NCAA national office’s very existence relies on 
how successful “the steady drumbeat…[of the NCAA’s] aggressive public and media 
relations agenda” (NCAA, 2010c, para. 3–4) is at convincing Congress, the courts, 
the media, college-sport fans and the general public that academic success, not maxi-
mizing revenues (Brand, 2006), is the association’s real “core” value.
Note
1. The focus in this essay is on the NCAA as an institution (Southall et al., 2008). Consequently, 
while some of the literature utilizes analyses of branding/rebranding on corporate or organizational 
levels, these theoretical constructs are applicable to institutional branding/rebranding. Such usage 
is consistent with the literature, in which similar properties are applied to corporate, organizational, 
retail, service, and institutional brands (Berry, 2000; Birtwistle & Freathy, 1998).
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